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Abstract  
The chaebol, a South Korean form of business conglomerate, has been a key factor in the 
country’s economic growth. In this study, the chaebol sector is added to the asset-liability matrix 
derived from a flow-of-funds (FOF) analysis in order to explain the role of the chaebol in the 
Korean financial system. We find that the power-of-dispersion indices in the asset-oriented system 
differ between the chaebol and other private corporations. Between 1987 and 2002, the former has 
increased while the latter has declined. In the case of the chaebol, excess liabilities were reduced, 
while investments in financial assets were increased. This tendency led to an increase in the 
power-of-dispersion index in this asset-oriented system. Our previous research found a decrease in 
this index for the private sector in Korea. However, the index increased for chaebol when the 
private sector is divided into the chaebol and small/medium-sized corporations in this paper. 
These results point to a greater concentration of economic power in the chaebol in the Korean 
financial market. 
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1. Introduction 
The chaebol, a South Korean form of business conglomerate, has been a key factor in the 
country’s economic growth. In general, a group of large-scale, family-run management 
enterprises is referred to as a chaebol. Jones and Sakong (1980) defined a chaebol as the Korean 
term for a conglomerate of many companies clustered and managed by one family-centered 
parent company. The characteristics of a chaebol are similar to those of the zaibatsu of pre-war 
Japan. According to Kim (2000), the ratio of capital to bank loans of chaebol is higher than that 
of the pre-war zaibatsu. 
The birth of the chaebol dates back to the 1950s or earlier in Korea. However, it was not until 
the early 1980s that they emerged as entities that enjoyed a monopolistic concentration of 
capital. Many firms appeared in Korea in the 1950s, with some of them accumulating a huge 
influx of wealth. The chaebol were formed during the rule of Syngman Rhee, supported by the 
sale of property formerly owned by the colonial Japanese government, foreign-aid, and an 
import-substitution industrialization policy (Choi, 2007). When Park Chung-hee came to power 
in 1961, a policy of industrialization and financial support contributed to the advancement of the 
Korean chaebol system (Amsden, 1989). Moreover, in the 1980s, the chaebol wanted a more 
liberal financial system that would allow greater control over capital and investment. At the 
same time, they also wanted the system to remain protected to the extent that it provided them 
with cheap credit (Amsden and Euh, 1992). According to Lee et al. (2002), the top 30 chaebol 
owned 12 security companies (out of a total of 25), 18 insurance companies (out of a total of 35) 
and 18 investment trust companies (out of a total of 38) in 1988. The chaebol became less 
dependent on government-controlled commercial banks, while the government lost much of its 
power to influence the chaebol's investment decisions. 
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Many researchers have pointed out that the Korean government’s policy on interest rates and 
financial activities led to the concentration of economic power in the chaebol. According to Lee 
(2002), during the 1980s and 1990s, the top 30 chaebol accounted for more than one third of the 
nation’s industrial output. In particular, they ran non-banking financial companies themselves, 
using them as a tool to raise capital. This enabled the chaebol to raise money on their own in 
spite of government restrictions on the total amount of loans and credit that a bank could extend 
to the chaebol. Krueger and Yoo (2002) estimated asset growth rates of the Big 5 and Big 30 
chaebol and the total manufacturing sector from 1985 to 1999. They argued that the growth of 
chaebol assets has been much more rapid than that of non-chaebol firms. However, most 
research has focused on the financial structure of the chaebol or on a comparative analysis of 
the large and small/medium-sized corporations. Unfortunately, some research was not based on 
logical analysis due to a lack of data. It is difficult to quantify the effects or interactions between 
the chaebol and other sectors in the financial system, such as banks, the government, and 
households.  
This paper analyzes the chaebol using flow-of-funds (FOF) accounts. The FOF accounts 
consist of the balance sheets of all institutional sectors in a country, including the foreign sector. 
The FOF table shows the interrelations between various institutional sectors. In this analysis, we 
integrate the chaebol into FOF accounts. Applying the input-output analysis method to FOF 
accounts, Y and Y∗ matrices (asset-liability matrix of institutional sector-by-institutional sector) 
are obtained. Furthermore, using a Leontief inverse matrix, four kinds of indices (the 
power-of-dispersion index and the sensitivity-of-dispersion index) are estimated. Some previous 
studies attempted to subdivide the corporate sector of the FOF accounts into various industries. 
For example, Nishiyama (1991) used the balance sheets and income statements of each industry 
in Japan to subdivide nonfinancial corporations in FOF accounts into 37 industries. In this paper, 
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the power indices of 44 institutional sectors are reported. Kim (2016) used this method to 
disaggregate the Korean FOF accounts into 115 institutional sectors, including 95 types of 
inter-industries, combined with the Financial Statement Analysis data. According to these 
studies, using balance sheets and income statement data for each industry, it is possible to 
generate expanded FOF accounts that indicate the financial transactions of each industry. 
Therefore, if the financial statements of the chaebol are obtained, then it will be possible to add 
the chaebol sector to the FOF account. This research aims to find and identify the characteristics 
and roles of the chaebol in the financial system of Korea. This paper consists of four sections. 
The first section is the introduction. The second section explains the data and the analytical 
method adopted in this study. The third section describes the results of our research in three 
parts. Conclusions are drawn in the last section. 
 
 
2. Data and Research Methods  
1) Data 
For the purpose of analysis, the FOF accounts and chaebol balance sheets are used. Since the 
data in the Korean FOF accounts in the 1993 SNA is only available back to 2002, I decided to 
adopt the FOF accounts in the 1968 SNA, which are composed of nine institutional sectors and 
available from 1975 to 2005. By using the chaebol’s balance sheets, Korean corporations can be 
classified into two categories: the “chaebol” and “other private corporations.” The volume of 
financial transactions by other private corporations is calculated by subtracting chaebol entries 
from the balance sheets. This study uses balance sheets for the top 30 chaebol compiled through 
collaboration with the Institute for Participatory Society and the Institute of Business and 
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Economic Research (IBER) of Inha University
1
 These balance sheets are available from 1987 
to 2002. Table 1 shows a list of the top 30 chaebol used in this paper. We will focus our 
analysis on data from the years 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002. Data for 1998, one year after the 
Asian financial crisis, were also added to the analysis. Table 1 shows the list of the top 30 
chaebol for each year.  
 
<Table 1 is inserted about here> 
 
2) Reconstruction of FOF Tables 
The FOF table shows the interrelations between the various institutional sectors in a 
systematic and coherent way. The FOF system adopts the quadruple-entry system proposed by 
Copeland (1952), in which each transaction is recorded with a double entry. While the FOF 
table, which is published by the Bank of Korea, contains only financial assets and liabilities, the 
chaebol balance sheets include real assets and liabilities as well. By referencing a guide to 
writing FOF tables and the Bank of Korea website, only the items used in FOF accounts are 
selected from the chaebol balance sheets. Based on the selected items, the institutional sector of 
private corporations in the FOF table is broken down into two sections, eventually creating 10 
sub-sections. We can also reconstruct the FOF table for each year, which is reflected in the 
chaebol balance sheets. 
 
3) Methodologies  
                                   
1 Refer to Appendix of Lee (2005). 
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In this analysis, I will apply the input-output analysis method devised by Tsujimura and 
Mizoshita (2002)
2
 to the FOF accounts. The Bank of Korea publishes quarterly and yearly FOF 
accounts for Korea which contain (1) financial transactions (flows), (2) financial assets and 
liabilities (stocks). The asset-liability matrix used in this paper has been compiled from the 
financial assets and liabilities tables of the annual FOF accounts.  
First, the procedure requires the construction of two tables E and R. Table E is a matrix 
representing the fund-employment portfolio of each institutional sector, while the table R shows 
the fundraising of each institutional sector. By applying the method widely used in input-output 
analysis, it is possible to make two types of square matrices Y and Y∗, using tables E and R. 
Table Y is based on a fund-employment portfolio, while Y∗ is founded on a fundraising 
portfolio. Matrix R and transposed matrix E are substituted for U and V to obtain table Y. 
 
U ≡ R 
V ≡ E′ 
In the case of the fund-employment assumption, matrix E and transposed matrix R are taken for 
table Y∗. 
 
U∗ ≡ R′ 
V∗ ≡ E 
 
The m×m (m: number of institutional sectors) coefficient matrices C and C∗ are estimated 
using the institutional sector portfolio assumption.  
                                   
2 For details, see Tsujimura and Mizoshita (2002a), Kim (2016) in English and Tsujimura and Mizoshita (2002b), pp. 
32-43 and pp. 116-129 in Japanese. 
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C = DB 
C∗ = D∗B∗ 
 
Each element of the transaction quantity matrices Y and Y∗ are then obtained as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑗 
y𝑖𝑗
∗ = c𝑖𝑗
∗ 𝑡𝑗 
 
Here, 𝑡𝑗 vector represents the sum of either assets or liabilities. 𝑦𝑖𝑗 is the amount of funds 
provided from the ith to jth institutional sector, and y𝑖𝑗
∗  is the amount of funds from the jth to 
ith institutional sector. 
Next, we apply the Leontief Inverse to obtain the indices of the power and the sensitivity of 
dispersion to the asset-liabilities matrix. Table Y can be expressed in matrix terms as follows, 
where εY represents excess liabilities. 
 
CTY＋εY＝TY 
 
Solving each equation for  TY yields 
 TY＝(I − C)−1εY 
TY＝IεY + CεY＋C2εY＋C3εY＋⋯ 
 
where I denotes the m  m unit matrix and (I − C)−1 is Leontief inverse matrix. Matrix Γ is 
expressed as follows: 
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Γ＝(I − C)−1＝ [
γ11 γ12 ⋯ γ1m
γ21
⋮
γ22
⋮
…
⋱
γ2m
⋮
γm1 γm2 … γmm
] 
 
Using γij , it is possible to calculate indices for both power-of-dispersion and 
sensitivity-of-dispersion in the liability-oriented system. The power-of-dispersion index, ωj
Y 
and the sensitivity-of-dispersion index,  zi
Y are expressed as follows.  
 
ωj
Y＝
∑ γij
m
i=1
1
m
∑ ∑ γij
m
i=1
m
j=1
 
 zi
Y＝
∑ γij
m
j=1
1
m
∑ ∑ γij
m
j=1
m
i=1
 
 
Using the same method as in Y∗, we can also estimate the power-of-dispersion index, ωj
Y∗ and 
the sensitivity-of-dispersion index,  zi
Y∗ in the asset-oriented system.  
The power-of-dispersion index in the liability-oriented system describes the relative extent to 
which a unit increase in demand for capital of a given institutional sector is dispersed 
throughout the financial system. The power-of-dispersion index in the asset-oriented system 
measures the increase in the final supply to the system of industries in general as driven by a 
unit increase in the capital supply of a given institutional sector. The sensitivity-of-dispersion 
index in the liability-oriented system measures the amount of funds which can be raised in a 
given institutional sector, directly or indirectly driven by a unit increase in the final borrowing 
for all institutional sectors in the system. Meanwhile, the sensitivity-of-dispersion index in the 
asset-oriented system describes the extent to which money can be supplied to a given 
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institutional sector, directly or indirectly driven by a unit increase in the final lending for all 
institutional sectors in the system. 
 
 
3. Results 
1) Liability Portfolios of Corporations 
First, we begin by using this section to analyze the financial structures of the chaebol. Tables 2 
and 3 show the liabilities of the top 30 chaebol. In Table 2, the total liabilities peaked in 1997 
during the Korean economic crisis. The debt ratio of the chaebol shown in Table 3 reveals that 
the ratio of marketable securities they hold rose from 29.0% in 1987 to 47.1% in 2002. This 
indicates a shift from indirect to direct financing. The ratio of stocks had fallen from 14.3% in 
1987 to 8.1% in 1997, a clear indicator that they had difficulty raising money from the stock 
market during the financial crisis. The ratio of corporate bonds soared from 10.1% in 1997 to 
30.5% in 1998. Meanwhile, the ratio of loans, an indirect fundraising method, fell from 47.1% 
in 1987 to 16.9% in 2002.  
 
<Tables 2 and 3 are inserted about here> 
 
Table 4 shows the liability portfolios of the chaebol and other private corporations created 
using table Y. As shown in Table 3, the chaebol borrowed 21.9% of their money from other 
financial institutions and 21.2% from banks in 1987. However, in the 1990s, loans from banks 
fell to 17.9% while those from other financial institutions rose to 31.7% in 1998. Corporations 
other than the chaebol show a similar trend in financing sources as the chaebol. However, we 
find that the ratio of fundraising from banks by other private corporations rose to 28.1% in 2002. 
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Another contrast between the two entities can be observed in the way they raise funds through 
subsidiaries. To overcome the global financial crisis, the chaebol increased dependence on their 
subsidiaries for funding, with these arrangements making up 14.6% of liabilities in 1997 and 
12.9% in 1998. This is a trend not observed in other private corporations. It is noteworthy that 
the chaebol’s funding from other private corporations rose to 16.7% in 2002. In the 2000s, the 
lending of other financial institutions to the chaebol fell while the flow of capital from other 
private corporations to the business conglomerates increased. Such diversification of funding 
sources is not seen in corporations other than the chaebol. Other private corporations showed a 
reliance on banks and other financial institutions for funding.  
 
<Table 4 is inserted about here> 
 
2) Power-of-dispersion Index and Sensitivity-of-dispersion Index Analysis 
Figures 1 and 2 show the power-of-dispersion index and the sensitivity-of-dispersion index 
for the different institutional sectors. The baseline for the index used to measure the extent of 
dispersion is one. The major benefit of these indices is that they enable identification of the 
relative position of each institutional sector in the financial market where the institutional 
sectors are interdependent on one another in a direct or indirect way. The power-of-dispersion 
index in the liability-oriented system is shown in the rows while the power-of-dispersion index 
in the asset-oriented system is shown in the columns. Each institutional sector is placed in a 
four-quadrant graph. For example, households with excess savings are generally located in the 
second quadrant because they exercise more power over assets and less power over liabilities. 
Meanwhile, corporations with excess investment are placed in the fourth quadrant because 
they hold more power over liabilities and less power over assets. 
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<Figures 1 and 2 are inserted about here> 
 
Figure 1 shows the relations between the power-of-dispersion index in the liability-oriented 
system and the one in the asset-oriented system in 1987 and 2002. In 1987, the Bank of Korea, 
banks, and other financial institutions were located in the first quadrant. Individuals (most of 
them households), general government, and insurance and pension funds belonged to the second 
quadrant. All corporations and the rest of the world (overseas sector) were placed in the fourth 
quadrant. The Bank of Korea and the overseas sector shifted to the fourth quadrant in 1997 and 
the first quadrant in 1998.  
Figure 2 shows the sensitivity-of-dispersion index in the liability-oriented and asset-oriented 
systems. Unlike in the case of the power-of-dispersion index, corporations and individuals are 
expected to be in the second and fourth quadrant, respectively. In 1987, the Bank of Korea, 
insurance and pension funds, public corporations, and the overseas sector stayed in the third 
quadrant, showing a neutral trend. Banks, a classic example of a financial intermediary, and 
other financial institutions are located in the first quadrant while the chaebol belong in the 
second quadrant. One thing to note is that, contrary to expectations, other private corporations 
and individuals belong to the first quadrant. Based on the data from 2000, Tsujimura and 
Mizoshita (2002b) demonstrated that Japanese households were located in the first quadrant. 
This reflects how households, characterized by excess savings, have invested in assets such as 
houses. We also observe a shift in the sensitivity-of-dispersion index for corporations, when 
private corporations moved to the second quadrant in the 1990s while the chaebol shifted to the 
third quadrant in 2002.  
For corporations, all indices shifted with the exception of the power-of-dispersion index in 
the liability-oriented system, which stayed at the 1.2 level during this period. Both the chaebol 
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and other private corporations show a downward trend in the sensitivity-of-dispersion index in 
the liability-oriented system. In the power-of-dispersion index in the asset-oriented system, the 
chaebol recorded 0.6 in 1987 with the figure rising to 0.68 in 2002. By contrast, the figure for 
private corporations fell from 0.79 to 0.59 during the same period. In the 
sensitivity-of-dispersion index in the asset-oriented system, the chaebol remained at 1.3 until 
the 1990s when the figure fell to 0.65 in 2002. This figure rose to 1.83 in 2002 for other 
corporations.  
 
3) Asset Portfolios of Corporations 
In the previous section, we showed that for chaebol the power index in the asset-oriented 
system rose from 1987 to 2002. In contrast, the index fell for other private corporations during 
that period. In our previous study, Kim (2013) estimated the power-of-dispersion index of 
private corporations in Korea and Japan from the 1970s until 2012. According to this 
comparative analysis, the power index in the asset-oriented system of private corporations has 
steadily increased in Japan, finally exceeding standards
3
 after 2010. In contrast, the power 
index of private corporations has fallen in Korea.  
Going one step further, we divided private corporations between the chaebol and other 
private corporations in Korea. The decreasing tendency of the power index in the asset-oriented 
system of Korean private corporations is caused by characteristics of other private corporations. 
The power index of the chaebol had grown until 2002. In Japan, we find that private 
corporations have reduced investment in equipment and focused instead on financial investment, 
giving rise to the increase in the power index in the asset-oriented system. 
                                   
3 The index is standardized by 1. 
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Let us put this into perspective by looking at the asset ratio of the chaebol in Table 5. In 1997, 
marketable securities accounted for less than 20% of their total assets, but in 2002 this figure 
had risen to 54.4%. By contrast, trade credits represented more than 40% of assets until the end 
of the 1990s, falling to 17.4% in 2002. Table 6 shows that the asset portfolios of the chaebol 
shifted dramatically to other financial institutions. A previous study by Lee (2002) concluded 
that the chaebol found it easier to borrow money from banks in the 1980s, in contrast to the past 
when their major source of capital was the non-banking sector. In our study, we find that they 
invested more actively in non-banking financial institutions in the 2000s. 
 
<Tables 5 and 6 are inserted about here> 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This research examined FOF analysis by adding the chaebol sector to asset-liability matrix 
with the goal of discovering the role of the chaebol in the financial system of Korea. Using FOF 
accounts and the balance sheets of the top 30 chaebol, we divided the private corporate sector 
into chaebol and other private corporations. We obtained new asset-liability matrices for the 
private corporate sector which were then restructured and analyzed in order to discover the 
characteristics of the chaebol and other private corporations during the past 15 years. 
The chaebol of Korea, which appeared in the 1950s, rapidly accumulated wealth through 
foreign aid and government property transfers to private ownership. Under Park, who came to 
power in the 1960s, the chaebol dominated the product market of Korea, assisted by heavy and 
chemical industry policy and an import-substitution industrialization policy. The government 
intensively supported the chaebol in order to raise the competitiveness of Korean corporations 
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in the international market. Furthermore, the financial liberalization policy of the 1980s helped 
the chaebol to enter the financial market. The chaebol expanded to the non-banking sector 
immediately, prompted by deregulation of nonbank depository institutions and the privatization 
of some government-owned banks. Through financial liberalization and the growth of the stock 
market, the fundraising strategy of the chaebol changed from indirect to direct. This has been 
noted in previous research and is also found in the FOF accounts used in this analysis, which are 
composed of only financial items,  
It is no exaggeration to say that the chaebol led the rapid economic growth of Korea. However, 
the concentration of economic power in the chaebol deepened in both the product and financial 
markets. According to Choi (2007), this concentration of economic power appeared not only in 
the economic sector, but in the non-economic sector as well. For instance, 
links between politics and big business broke the economic system. Though the government 
imposed restraints on the chaebol in the late 1980s, research demonstrating a decrease of the 
chaebol’s concentration of economic power is rare.  
In this paper, financial transactions of the institutional sectors (Y and Y∗) are estimated by 
applying an input-output analysis method. Fundraising from banks and other financial 
institutions increased, while fundraising from the corporate sector decreased for other private 
corporations. However, in the financial structure of the chaebol, we found that fundraising from 
other private corporations increased, not that funds from banks decreased. [[Please confirm]] On 
the other hand, the deposits of other private corporations in asset portfolios grew. Moreover, the 
fund-employment share to banks and other financial institutions
4
 increased. In other words, the 
financial structure of small and medium-sized corporations is deeply dependent on the financial 
sector. In contrast, for the chaebol, the fund-employment share to banks was sharply reduced, 
                                   
4 We can speculate that the financial sector requires a secured loan or a compensating balance (an amount a lending 
institution requires a borrower to leave on deposit during the term of a loan) to small and medium-sized enterprises. 
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while other financial institutions and other private corporations appeared to expand in the 
chaebol's asset portfolios. In addition, chaebol investment in securities increased drastically, 
accounting for about 50% of the financial assets of the chaebol (table E) in 2002. In other words, 
the chaebol carried out not only the corporations’ original role of raising funds from other 
institutional sectors and producing, but also making investments as is done in the financial 
sector. To sum up, it seems that the chaebol's concentration of economic power in the financial 
market and their influence on small and medium-sized corporations were much stronger.  
 We also examined the four indices using a Leontief inverse matrix. We found that the 
power-of-dispersion indices in the asset-oriented system differed between the chaebol and other 
private corporations. Between 1987 and 2002, the former increased, while the latter decreased. 
In the case of the chaebol, excess liabilities were reduced, while investments in financial assets 
rose. This tendency increased the power-of-dispersion index in the asset-oriented system. Our 
previous research found that this index was decreased in the Korean private corporate sector. 
However, the index of the chaebol was increased when the private corporate sector was divided 
into the chaebol and small/medium-sized corporations in the paper. Such results appear to 
explain the chaebol’s increased concentration of economic power in the Korean financial 
market.  
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Table 1. Top 30 Chaebol 
 
 
 
1987 1992 1997 1998 2002
1 Hyundai Hyundai Hyundai Hyundai Samsung
2 Daewoo Samsung Samsung Daewoo LG
3 LG Daewoo Daewoo Samsung SK
4 Samsung LG LG LG
Hyundai Motor
Group
5 Hanjin SK SK SK Hanjin
6 Ssangyong Hanjin Hanjin Hanjin Lotte
7 SK Ssangyong Ssangyong Ssangyong Hyundai
8 Hanwha KIA Hanwha Hanwha Kumho
9 Lotte Hanwha Kumho Kumho
Hyundai Heavy
Industries Group
10 KIA Lotte Donga Lotte Hanwha
11 Daelim Kumho Lotte Donga Doosan
12 Donga Daelim Halla Hansol Dongbu
13 Hanil Doosan Daelim Doosan Hyundai Oil
14 Hyosung Donga Doosan Daelim Hyosung
15 Doosan Hanil Hansol
Dongkuk Steel
Group
Daelim
16
Dongkuk Steel
Group
Hyosung Hyosung Dongbu Kolon
17
Pan Ocean
Shipping
Dongkuk Steel
Group
Kohap Halla CJ
18 Kolon Halla Kolon Kohap
Dongkuk Steel
Group
19 Kumho Tongyang
Dongkuk Steel
Group
Hyosung Hanaro Telecom
20 Kukdong E & C Kolon Dongbu Kolon Hansol
21 Dongbu Jinro Anam Tongyang Shinsegye
22
Woo Sung
Construction
Dongbu Jinro Jinro Tongyang
23 Kohap Kohap Tongyang Anam
Hyundai
Department Store
24 Haitai Kukdong E & C Haitai Haitai
Hyundai
Development
25 Tongil
Woo Sung
Construction
Shinho Saehan Youngpoong
26 Daesang Haitai Daesang Kangwon Industry Daesang
27 Taekwang Byucksan Newcore Daesang Dongwon
28 Kangwon Industry Daesang Geopyeong CJ Cheiljedang
Taekwang
Industrial Co.
29 Samwhan Anam Kangwon Industry Shinho KCC
30 Shindonga Hanbo Saehan Samyang
Oriental Chemical
Industries Group
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Table 2. Liabilities of the Chaebol (using table R, in Bil. KRW) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1987 1992 1997 1998 2002
15930.9 52049.2 119552.3 157520.3 106441.8
Commercial papers 2530.5 10040.5 19645.4 16393.8 2192.4
Corporate bonds 
(including current portion)
　Current portion of bonds 1181.5 8260.6 16223.9 23465.7 17380.9
　Corporate bonds 4389.2 16550.5 55325.7 83338.1 41324.9
Stocks 7829.8 17197.5 28357.3 34322.8 45543.7
25839.7 51141.4 147605 116451.4 38105.8
18215.2 35639.9 90371.1 84779.9 25915.2
Short-term loans 9358.8 20458.2 58034.4 48598.1 10062.3
Long-term loans
(including current portion)
　Current portion of long-term loans 984.8 2633.5 6842.5 8196.1 4301.7
　Long-term loans 7871.5 12548.1 25494.1 27985.6 11551.2
7624.5 15501.6 57233.9 31671.5 12190.6
Short-term loans 1025.8 4582.1 19863.5 10733 7742.6
Long-term loans
(including current portion)
　Current portion of long-term loans 1083.8 2187.3 6319.7 4666.8 1574.1
　Long-term loans 5243.7 8714.2 31050.7 16080 2873.9
Foreign-aid 271.2 18 0 191.7 0
7512 21196.9 50223.5 42709.3 45004.6
5612.2 15816.3 34843.7 33720.2 36339.4
54894.9 140203.8 352224.5 350401.1 225891.6
Securities
5570.7 24811.2 106803.7 58705.8
Loans and foreign-aid
　　Loans (KRW)
8856.3 15181.6 32336.6 36181.7 15852.9
71549.6
　　Loans (foreign currency and foreign-aid)
6327.5 10901.5 37370.4 4448
Trade credits
Others
Total
20746.8
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Table 3. Liabilities of the Chaebol (in percentage) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1987 1992 1997 1998 2002
29.00% 37.10% 33.90% 45.00% 47.10%
Commercial papers 4.60% 7.20% 5.60% 4.70% 1.00%
Corporate bonds 
(including current portion)
　Current portion of bonds 2.20% 5.90% 4.60% 6.70% 7.70%
　Corporate bonds 8.00% 11.80% 15.70% 23.80% 18.30%
Stocks 14.30% 12.30% 8.10% 9.80% 20.20%
47.10% 36.50% 41.90% 33.20% 16.90%
33.20% 25.40% 25.70% 24.20% 11.50%
Short-term loans 17.00% 14.60% 16.50% 13.90% 4.50%
Long-term loans
(including current portion)
　Current portion of long-term loans 1.80% 1.90% 1.90% 2.30% 1.90%
　Long-term loans 14.30% 8.90% 7.20% 8.00% 5.10%
13.90% 11.10% 16.20% 9.00% 5.40%
Short-term loans 1.90% 3.30% 5.60% 3.10% 3.40%
Long-term loans
(including current portion)
　Current portion of long-term loans 2.00% 1.60% 1.80% 1.30% 0.70%
　Long-term loans 9.60% 6.20% 8.80% 4.60% 1.30%
Foreign-aid 0.50% 0.00% 0.00% 0.10% 0.00%
13.70% 15.10% 14.30% 12.20% 19.90%
10.20% 11.30% 9.90% 9.60% 16.10%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
26.00%
Securities
10.10% 17.70% 20.30% 30.50%
Loans and foreign-aid
　　Loans (KRW)
16.10% 10.80%
Trade credits
Others
Total
10.30% 7.00%
　　Loans (foreign currency and foreign-aid)
11.50% 7.80% 10.60% 5.90% 2.00%
9.20%
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Table 4. Liability Portfolios of the Chaebol and Other Private Corporations  
(using table Y, in percentage) 
 
 
Table 5. Financial Assets of the Chaebol (using table E, in percentage) 
 
 
Table 6. Asset Portfolios of the Chaebol (using table Y, in percentage) 
 
Chaebol Others Chaebol Others Chaebol Others Chaebol Others Chaebol Others
Bank of Korea 2.30% 2.80% 2.40% 1.70% 2.10% 1.30% 1.70% 1.40% 0.80% 0.50%
Banks 21.20% 20.50% 17.50% 22.20% 18.60% 21.00% 17.90% 21.80% 16.90% 28.10%
Insurance & pension funds 5.10% 4.80% 6.10% 6.90% 4.90% 5.60% 5.10% 5.60% 7.50% 7.50%
Other financial institutions 21.90% 20.80% 28.60% 32.40% 28.10% 31.80% 31.70% 34.40% 26.10% 29.30%
General government 6.80% 6.50% 5.00% 5.30% 4.90% 5.30% 5.70% 6.20% 7.80% 8.60%
Public corporations 2.20% 2.40% 1.90% 1.20% 1.70% 0.90% 1.90% 1.10% 3.10% 1.50%
Chaebol 7.80% 8.70% 11.30% 6.40% 14.60% 5.90% 12.90% 6.40% 7.40% 3.50%
Other private corporations 12.50% 14.00% 9.80% 6.50% 5.10% 4.50% 4.30% 3.50% 16.70% 6.20%
Individuals 10.10% 9.90% 11.70% 10.30% 7.10% 8.30% 8.80% 7.80% 6.80% 5.40%
Rest of the world 10.10% 9.60% 5.60% 7.20% 12.90% 15.50% 10.00% 11.80% 6.90% 9.40%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1987 1992 1997 1998 2002
1987 1992 1997 1998 2002
Currency 0.30% 0.10% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Deposits 13.70% 16.70% 11.60% 4.00% 0.50%
Securities 18.60% 19.40% 19.70% 34.20% 54.40%
Trade credits 42.80% 43.80% 47.90% 41.30% 17.40%
Loans 1.20% 0.20% 0.40% 1.30% 6.30%
Others 23.40% 19.90% 20.40% 19.30% 21.30%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1987 1992 1997 1998 2002
Bank of Korea 2.70% 2.50% 1.20% 2.40% 4.60%
Banks 14.10% 13.00% 11.70% 7.90% 7.20%
Insurance & pension funds 1.10% 1.30% 1.60% 1.80% 3.10%
Other financial institutions 14.60% 19.90% 17.50% 20.60% 29.60%
General government 1.10% 0.80% 1.00% 1.80% 3.90%
Public corporations 8.10% 6.00% 5.50% 6.30% 5.40%
Chaebol 18.40% 25.20% 30.40% 28.10% 13.40%
Other private corporations 28.10% 18.60% 16.60% 18.40% 23.50%
Individuals 11.60% 12.60% 13.90% 11.90% 7.60%
Rest of the world 0.20% 0.10% 0.60% 0.90% 1.80%
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Figure 1. Power-of-dispersion Indices in Asset-oriented and Liability-oriented Systems in 1987 
and 2002 
 
Figure 2. Sensitivity-of-dispersion Indices in Asset-oriented and Liability-oriented Systems in 
1987 and 2002 
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